E Sartre afinal estava comigo
Moral relativism takes the position that moral or ethical propositions do not reflect absolute and universal moral truths, but instead make claims relative to social, cultural, historical or personal references. Moral relativism also says that no single standard exists by which to assess an ethical proposition's truth. Relativistic positions often see moral values as applicable only within certain cultural boundaries or in the context of individual preferences.
An extreme relativist position might suggest that judging the moral or ethical judgments or acts of another person or group has no meaning, though most relativists propound a more limited version of the theory.
Some moral relativists — for example, the existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre — hold that a personal and subjective moral core lies or ought to lie at the foundation of individuals' moral acts. In this view public morality reflects social convention, and only personal, subjective morality expresses true authenticity.
Moral relativism does not equate to moral pluralism or to value pluralism. Moral relativism, in contrast, contends that opposing moral positions have no truth-value, and that no preferred standard of reference exists by which to judge them.
PML
An extreme relativist position might suggest that judging the moral or ethical judgments or acts of another person or group has no meaning, though most relativists propound a more limited version of the theory.
Some moral relativists — for example, the existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre — hold that a personal and subjective moral core lies or ought to lie at the foundation of individuals' moral acts. In this view public morality reflects social convention, and only personal, subjective morality expresses true authenticity.
Moral relativism does not equate to moral pluralism or to value pluralism. Moral relativism, in contrast, contends that opposing moral positions have no truth-value, and that no preferred standard of reference exists by which to judge them.
PML
PML,
E o relativismo cultural (aqui incluído), que, em algumas acepções correntes, diferentes das que lhe deram causa pode, no limite, pôr em causa a defesa dos Direitos Humanos. Se nada tem valor-verdade, então que se desça dos conceitos operativos à realidade e se assuma que nada deve ser feito por causa dessa tal ausência de verdade e em nome de um relativismo moral e cultural que tudo permite.
E os boers na Àfrica do Sul e o apartheid? Andou mal a comunidade internacional quando aplicou sanções àquele país? E a excisão feminina, é um traço de matriz cultural, certo? Se tudo se permite em nome desse teu relativismo então nada se fará (ou que tem sido feito está mal) por respeito à cultura alheia. E a escravatura? Também não era matriz cultural, pilar económico, societal?
Pois. É o que dá origem às politicas (são politicas) multiculturalistas, desastrosas na formulação e nos efeitos.
By-standers. É o que interessa que todos sejamos.
Com interesse, fica isto (e desculpa pelo longo comentário):
"Cultural relativism, long a key concept in anthropology, asserts that since each culture has its own values and practices, anthropologists should not make value judgments about cultural differences. As a result, anthropological pedagogy has stressed that the study of customs and norms should be value-free, and that the appropriate role of the anthropologist is that of observer and recorder.
The issue of violence against women throws the perils of cultural relativism into stark relief. Following the lead of human-rights advocates, a growing number of anthropologists and others are coming to recognize that violence against women should be acknowledged as a violation of a basic human right to be free from harm. They believe that such violence cannot be excused or justified on cultural grounds.
Let me refer to my own experience. For nearly 25 years, I have conducted research in the Sudan, one of the African countries where the practice of female circumcision is widespread, affecting the vast majority of females in northern Sudan. Chronic infections are a common result, and sexual intercourse and childbirth are rendered difficult and painful. However, cultural ideology in the Sudan holds that an uncircumcised woman is not respectable, and few families would risk their daughter's chances of marrying by not having her circumcised. British colonial officials outlawed the practice in 1946, but this served only to make it surreptitious and thus more dangerous. Women found it harder to get treatment for mistakes or for side effects of the illegal surgery.
For a long time I felt trapped between, on one side, my anthropologist's understanding of the custom and of the sensitivities about it among the people with whom I was working, and, on the other, the largely feminist campaign in the West to eradicate what critics see as a "barbaric" custom. To ally myself with Western feminists and condemn female circumcision seemed to me to be a betrayal of the value system and culture of the Sudan, which I had come to understand. But as I was asked over the years to comment on female circumcision because of my expertise in the Sudan, I came to realize how deeply I felt that the practice was harmful and wrong.
In 1993, female circumcision was one of the practices deemed harmful by delegates the international Human Rights Conference in Vienna. During their discussions, they came to view circumcision as a violation of the rights of children as well as of the women who suffer its consequences throughout life. Those discussions made me realize that there was a moral agenda larger than myself, larger than Western culture or the culture of the northern Sudan or my discipline. I decided to join colleagues from other disciplines and cultures in speaking out against the practice.
Some cultures are beginning to change, although cause and effect are difficult to determine. Women's associations in the Ivory Coast are calling for an end to female circumcision. In Egypt, the Cairo Institute of Human Rights has reported the first publicly acknowledged marriage of an uncircumcised woman. In the United States, a Nigerian women recently was granted asylum on the ground that her returning to her country would result in the forcible circumcision of her daughter, which was deemed a violation of the girl's human rights.
To be sure, it is not easy to achieve consensus concerning the point as to which cultural practices cross the line and become violations of human rights. But it is important that scholars and human-rights activists discuss the issue. Some examples of when the line is crossed may be clearer than others. The action of a Japanese wife who feels honor-bound to commit suicide because of the shame of her husband's infidelity can be explained and perhaps justified by the traditional code of honor in Japanese society. However, when she decides to take the lives of her children as well, she is committing murder, which may be eaiser to condemn than suicide.
What about "honor" killings of sisters and daughters accused of sexual misconduct in some Middle Eastern societies? Some anthropologists have explained this practice in culturally relativist terms, saying that severe disruptions of the moral order occur when sexual impropriety is alleged or takes place. To restore the social equilibrium and avoid feuds, the local culture required the shedding of blood to wash away the shame of sexual dishonor. The practice of honor killings, which victimizes mainly women, has been defended in some local courts as less serious than premeditated murder, because it stems from long-standing cultural traditions. While some judges have agreed, anthropologists should see a different picture: a pattern of cultural discrimination against women.
Posted by
INF |
5:41 da tarde
"Moral relativism takes the position that moral or ethical propositions do not reflect absolute and universal moral truths, but instead make claims relative to social, cultural, historical or personal references."
INF,
Eu já sei que, para ti esta conversa é estéril.
A escravatura era, sim, matriz cultura, pilar económico e societal, tido maioritariamente por justo e conforme, em determinada circunstância espacio-temporal.
Isto e o contrário disto, não são verdades absolutas, nem proposições éticas incontornáveis, desde que, no plano dos factos, alguém aja contrariamente a cada uma dessas proposições, com a noção de que se está a agir correctamente.
O Hezbollah responsabilizou o governo israelita pelo ataque de Canaã. O Governo Israelita responsabilizou o Hezbollah.
Se tomarmos por sério que ambas as partes (ou parte das partes, ou até uma pessoa em cada uma das partes), sobre as mesmas premissas, não age com reserva mental ao dizer isso, concluimos que, até nesse universo restrito, não há um arquétipo abstracto e absoluto quanto à justificação para um ataque que vitima civis.
O mesmo quanto à excisão feminina.
O relativismo moral é apenas de constatação. Nada mais que isso. Não é política.
A operatividade do relativismo moral estará, quanto muito, em demonstrar que as acções tomadas sobre condutas subjectivamente incorrectas, perante uma maioria determinada (nomeadamente ocidental), não deverão ser vistas como imperativos éticos.
Porque, até que me provem o contrário, não os há.
Imperativos éticos que, no limite, serão tudo menos éticos, porque consideram sobretudo o valor e o arquétipo de valor, em detrimento da pessoa que o cria e dele livremente dispõe (no caso de ser a pessoa a livremente dispor - falo, nomeadamente, da excisão com consentimento).
Kant teve o condão de convencer uma data de pessoas da operatividade dos conceitos per relationem.
A dignidade, p.ex. é um conceito vazio, não-operativo (não vale nada) se não for traçado por referência ao sujeito titular dessa dignidade, sujeito esse que não é um sujeito portador-passivo, mas um sujeito criador-activo.
Três ideias, que gostava que retorquisses:
- As sanções ao apartheid não tiveram por base a violação de lei internacional, mero pacta sunt servanda (sem intromissão na moral, portanto)?
- É uma verdade, e portanto, passível de demonstração que quem tem por "incorrecto" a excisão feminina tem um grau de "moralidade" ou "esclarecimento" superior a quem a pratica de livre vontade?
- Quanto à descida dos conceitos operativos à realidade:
"Realidade" equivale a "realidade desejável"? Até que ponto é legítimo agir deônticamente sobre verdades não demonstradas?
É só isto que me ocupa a cabeça.
A montante, considero-me tão pertencente à matriz humanista como tu e, portanto, um não-pecador atraído pela filosofia progressista "mais valores, melhores valores" que ainda não consigo fundamentar.
Não fundamentando, não se abstractiza. Não abstractizando, resume-se "ao que eu acho".
É chato.
Posted by
Zé Gato |
1:30 da tarde